Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
Robustness and linear contracts
STCS Student Seminar
Speaker:
Soumyajit Pyne (TIFR)
Organiser:
Arghya Chakraborty
Date:
Friday, 1 Dec 2023, 14:30 to 15:30
Venue:
A-238
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Abstract:
We consider a game theoretic model with two players- the principal and the agent. The principal knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal evaluates contracts according to their worst-case performance, with respect to the actions that may or may not be available to the agent. Under very general circumstances, the unique optimal contract is linear.
| Speaker: | Soumyajit Pyne (TIFR) |
| Organiser: | Arghya Chakraborty |
| Date: | Friday, 1 Dec 2023, 14:30 to 15:30 |
| Venue: | A-238 |
(Scan to add to calendar)
Abstract:
We consider a game theoretic model with two players- the principal and the agent. The principal knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal evaluates contracts according to their worst-case performance, with respect to the actions that may or may not be available to the agent. Under very general circumstances, the unique optimal contract is linear.