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UID:www.tcs.tifr.res.in/event/1737
DTSTAMP:20260703T044749Z
SUMMARY:On the Existence of Fair and Stable Data Exchanges
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury (University of Illinois Urbana-C
 hampaign)\n\nAbstract: \nAcross many billion-dollar industries\, organizat
 ions pool proprietary data for mutual benefit without selling it. A striki
 ng feature of these arrangements is that participation is rarely open: acc
 ess is gated on contribution\, e.g.\, credit bureaus codify this as explic
 it "Principles of Reciprocity" — a subscriber receives the level of data
  it contributes and is expected to contribute all it has\; fraud consortia
  describe themselves as "give-to-get". This motivates reciprocity as a f
 irst-class design goal: each participant should receive value from the exc
 hange at least equal to the value its own data contributes to others\, whe
 re contributions are measured by a standard credit-sharing rule such as th
 e Shapley value. Reciprocity alone\, however\, is vacuous: the empty excha
 nge in which no one shares anything is trivially reciprocal\, yet useless.
  We therefore need a guarantee that the exchange is also efficient — tha
 t participants do not leave mutually beneficial trades on the table. We ca
 pture this through stability: no group of participants should be able to 
 break away and arrange a private exchange among themselves that every memb
 er strictly prefers. Stability\, too\, is trivial in isolation — the exc
 hange in which everyone shares everything is perfectly stable\, since no b
 reakaway group can do better — but it is generally not reciprocal. The t
 wo requirements thus pull in opposite directions and satisfying them toget
 her is far from obvious. Our main result shows that it is always possible:
  a data exchange that is simultaneously reciprocal and stable exists for a
 n extremely broad class of participant utilities (any monotone\, continuou
 s valuation of received data) and for any credit-sharing rule meeting mild
 \, standard conditions —  thereby\, covering several settings in which 
 such exchanges arise in practice.\n \nBio: Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury is an As
 sistant Professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems E
 ngineering at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC)\, with a 
 simultaneous affiliation in the Department of Computer Science. His resear
 ch lies at the intersection of economics and computation\, with primary co
 ntributions to fair division\, equilibrium computation\, incentive design 
 for federated learning\, and\, more recently\, the foundations of data eco
 nomics. He is the recipient of the NSF CAREER Award (2025)\, as well as th
 e Best Paper with Student Lead Author Award and the Exemplary Theory Track
  Paper Award at the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.\n
URL:https://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/web/events/1737
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260717T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260717T170000
LOCATION:A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)
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