Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
Emergent Cooperation Amongst Selfish Agents in Minority Games
Colloquium
Speaker:
Deepak Dhar
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
Department of Theoretical Physics
Homi Bhabha Road
Mumbai
Date:
Tuesday, 22 Mar 2011 (all day)
Venue:
A-212 (STCS Seminar Room)
(Scan to add to calendar)
Abstract:
I will discuss a variation of the minority game. There are $N$ agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to guess the choice others will make, based only the past history of number of people choosing the two alternatives. I will discuss a simple probabilistic strategy using which the agents acting selfishly, and independently, can still maximize the average number of people benefitting every day. The strategy leads to a very efficient utilization of resources.
| Speaker: | Deepak Dhar Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Department of Theoretical Physics Homi Bhabha Road Mumbai |
| Date: | Tuesday, 22 Mar 2011 (all day) |
| Venue: | A-212 (STCS Seminar Room) |
(Scan to add to calendar)
Abstract:
I will discuss a variation of the minority game. There are $N$ agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to guess the choice others will make, based only the past history of number of people choosing the two alternatives. I will discuss a simple probabilistic strategy using which the agents acting selfishly, and independently, can still maximize the average number of people benefitting every day. The strategy leads to a very efficient utilization of resources.