Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibrium
Student Seminar
Speaker:
Ratnik Gandhi
Organiser:
Karthyek Rajhaa A M
Date:
Friday, 22 Jun 2012, 15:00 to 16:30
Venue:
A-212 (STCS Seminar Room)
(Scan to add to calendar)
Abstract:
Correlated equilibria are a generalization of Nash equilibria. Existence of a correlated equilibrium is guaranteed due to existence of a Nash equilibrium. In this talk I will present a result of Germano & Lugosi(2007) that shows every finite normal form game possesses a sparsely supported correlated equilibrium.
Ref: Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2007. "Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 575-578, September.
| Speaker: | Ratnik Gandhi |
| Organiser: | Karthyek Rajhaa A M |
| Date: | Friday, 22 Jun 2012, 15:00 to 16:30 |
| Venue: | A-212 (STCS Seminar Room) |
(Scan to add to calendar)
Abstract:
Correlated equilibria are a generalization of Nash equilibria. Existence of a correlated equilibrium is guaranteed due to existence of a Nash equilibrium. In this talk I will present a result of Germano & Lugosi(2007) that shows every finite normal form game possesses a sparsely supported correlated equilibrium.
Ref: Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2007. "Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 575-578, September.
Ref: Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2007. "Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 575-578, September.