Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
Voting on Restricted Preference Domains: A Survey
STCS Seminar
Speaker:
Edith Elkind (Balliol College
University of Oxford
Department of Computer Science
Room 413, Wolfson Building
Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD
United Kingdom)
Organiser:
Umang Bhaskar
Date:
Monday, 11 Dec 2017, 10:00 to 11:00
Venue:
A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)
(Scan to add to calendar)
Abstract:
Arrow's famous impossibility theorem (1951) states that there is no perfect voting rule: for three or more candidates, no voting rule can satisfy a small set of very appealing axioms. However, this is no longer the case if we assume that voters' preferences satisfy certain restrictions, such as being single-peaked or single-crossing. In this talk, we discuss single-peaked and single-crossing elections, as well as some other closely related restricted preference domains, and provide an overview of recent algorithmic results for these domains.
| Speaker: | Edith Elkind (Balliol College University of Oxford Department of Computer Science Room 413, Wolfson Building Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD United Kingdom) |
| Organiser: | Umang Bhaskar |
| Date: | Monday, 11 Dec 2017, 10:00 to 11:00 |
| Venue: | A-201 (STCS Seminar Room) |
(Scan to add to calendar)
Abstract:
Arrow's famous impossibility theorem (1951) states that there is no perfect voting rule: for three or more candidates, no voting rule can satisfy a small set of very appealing axioms. However, this is no longer the case if we assume that voters' preferences satisfy certain restrictions, such as being single-peaked or single-crossing. In this talk, we discuss single-peaked and single-crossing elections, as well as some other closely related restricted preference domains, and provide an overview of recent algorithmic results for these domains.